finds that they have developed quite independently of one another, as tangents to development in other issue areas (efforts of industry to minimize their costs associated with worker injury; efforts to establish a comprehensive social security program, to prOVide for the needs of indigent people, and to compensate military personnel) rather than as part of a coherent policy towards disability. As a result, the benefits that one receives depend not on one's type of disability, but rather on the, origin of the disability or on the perceived worthiness of the disabled persons.
In spite of the diverse origins of these programs, however, they share a major characteristic in that they all look to the disabled person as the focus of the problem, and largely ignore the extent to which the problems of disability are also shaped by characteristics of society. The final part of the paper thus briefly considers recent programs to facilitate reentry of disabled people into the mainstream of society, and calls for expansion of such efforts.
Disability Policy: The Parts and the Whole
In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to social policies for people with disabilities, and there are many indications that disability policy is moving to the top of the health and welfare agenda. There are three major reasons for this increased concern for disabilities. One is the public's increasing awareness of the number of disabled people and the large social cost associated with their reduced productivity. One carefully developed estimate is that in 1973, l7%--or about 20 million--of the u.s. adult (aged 18-64), non-institutionalized population was disabled, where a person is defined as disabled if he or she is limited in the amount 1 or kind of work that can be performed.
_A second reason is the perceived cost of the programs. Disab.ility programs are considered to be very expensive and rapidly becoming more so, and there is concern whether resources are being efficiently allocated. Finally, there is the increased militancy on the part of disabled people. Breaking with the passive stereotypes and traditions of the past, the "shut-ins" of yesterday are asserting that they have not been shut in by their disabilities, but rather shut out of the mainstream of society, in part by the very policies ostensibly designed .
to help them.
What is coming to be called disability policy is in fact an aggregate of a variety of policies, each with quite different origins and purposes, reflecting an historical situation in which concern for disability has been intertwined with efforts to establish policy in much broader issueareas. These include efforts of industry to minimize their costs associated with worker injury~as well as efforts of other groups to establish a comprehensive social security program, to compensate military personnel, especially those injured in war, and to provide for the needs of indigent people. Rarely has public policy toward disability been introduced or analyzed as "disability policy." Rather, it has been most often seen as a subset of some other, more general policy area such as labor, veterans, or welfare policy.
The comprehensive approach to disability policy that is now emerging has the obvious advantage of allowing both analysts and policy makers to look at the problem of disability in its entirety, to see what the general pattern of policy has been, to assess the adequacy of coverage, to pinpoint the latent or unintended effects of the policy as a whole, and to show the areas that have been ignored. At the same time, however, there is a potential disadvantage to this aggregation. As with any major policy area, aggregation will generate a large figure for total cost. The danger here is that the cost figure will be considered in isolation and erroneously judged too high on its face rather than assessed in terms of the variety of needs to which the component programs have been addressed.
To facilitate the task of evaluating the whole of disability policy, we first consider the legislative development of its subparts. Our purpose here is to show that existing policy is really a very diverse set of minipolicies, diverse in the perceived needs it addresses, in the groups it seeks to benefit, in its legislative origins and purposes, and in the interest groups that battled over its enactment. Following our examination of the component parts of disability policy, we return to a consideration of the aggregate and consider the common elements and changing focus in disability policy as a whole. Here we find that in spite of the varied origins and purposes of disability policy, there as been, until recently, a common thread to it in that it has been oriented towards income maintenance and' minimal rehabilitation of disabled people rather than towards removal of the causes of disability, removal of structural .barriers to the employment of disabled people, or integration of disabled people into the mainstream of society.
MAJOR SUB-PARTS OF DISABILITY POLICY
In this section we analyze the legislative history of the four largest (i.e. most expensive) programs that are explicitly oriented towards people with disabilities. 2 These include workers' compensation, Social Security Disability Insurance, Supplemental Security Income, and benefits to disabled veterans.
I. . WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Workers' ("Workmen's") compensation is a system of state-sanctioned insurance programs which are to provide income maintenance, medical payments and rehabilitation services for work-related accidents or occupational disease, and death benefits to survivors of workers killed on the job. Today, all but five states have compulsory workers' compensation programs, although there is substantial variation in terms of coverage, adequacy of benefits, rehabilitation services, administration, and other commission, however, the situation has somewhat improved. for which data are available, the total paid under the various state and federal workers' compensation plans was close to $6 billion. 6
Issues
The key issue in the establishment of workers' compensation plans was who would bear the cost of injuries associated with the mechanization of American industry in the late 19th century. In the period from the mid-1800's to the late 1890's the United States changed from a predominantly agricultural country that imported most of its manufactured goods to the leading manufacturing country in the world; along with this rapid industrialization went a high accident and death rate. 7 Even more so than today, the general orientation of business in the heyday of laissezfaire capitalism was towards maximization of profit and minimization of costs.
Few resources were spent on safety measures, children were allowed to work at hazardous occupations, and laborers often worked long hours, even at dangerous jobs, without substantial rest.
Prior to the introduction of workers' compensation programs in the A young woman, Sarah Knisley, had her arm torn off by the unprotected gears of a grinding machine on which she was working. The state law provided that the gears should be covered; Miss Knisley had complained to her employer that they were not, and expressed fear about working at the machine in its present condition. But the employer warned her to do her job or quit, and she complied out of need of the job. The court held that in so doing she had assumed the risk of the dangerous condition and could not recover damages. Had she not known or complained of the illegal condition she would have had a cause of action; her knowledge made her liable. 9
These defenses, combined with others, such as the doctrine of contributory negligence (under which one cannot collect damages if one's actions contributed, even in small part, to the injury suffered) made it very difficult--but not impossible--for employees to collect damages from 10 employers.
A 1907 report by a Governor's Commission on court awards in Illinois showed, for example, that the average court settlement for the death of a miner was $294, and that, at any rate, a 'large share of 11 any award went to attorney's fees. favored some form of automatic compensation program. The main reasons offered by the NAM were the high expense and worker hostility caused by the litigation as well as the desire to avoid having the problem "settled 13 for us with a vengeance by the agitator and the demagogue."
Review of the various sources already cited indicates that the process of enactment of workers' compensation in Illinois was representative of the process in other states:
The Illinois Manufacturers Association (IMA), the state's leading business organization and spokesman for about 1,000 of its largest corporations, was an early and vocal proponent of compensation. In· 1905, protesting that the.existing system left employers "unable to extend the most rudimentary evidences of common humanity," it called for change but offered no specific remedy. In 1909, it began to agitate for compensation; and in 1910, in the wake of [a major industrial disaster], President LaVerne Noyes announced that the IMA had promised Governor Charles S. Deneen to support compensation, "secured the creation of an employers liability commission, rounded up sentiment among manufacturers for a fair bill, gave the state [commission] three of its most able men, who contributed their valuable time and wisdom, and used its influence to secure honest and fair provisions in a bill to be submitted to the General Assembly."
The IMA mounted a campaign to secure the plan's passage. It distr~buted a record amount of lite~ature to members requesting information on their needs and interests in compensation legislation, held meetings to explain provisions of the bill, and cooperated in securing facts needed by the commission and the general assembly. Never before, the organization reported in 1911, had it exerted itself so strenuously on behalf of a piece of legislation. 14 .
In other states, however., the influence of the Manufacturers Association seems to have been less, while that of the National Civic Federation, a broadly based "public interest" organization with substantial business 15 involvement, was much greater.
The role of labor in pressing for workers' compensation programs was less central, partly because of major differences of opinion within its ranks. Some workers and labor leaders favored the programs on the ground Under the program, a worker with 20 quarters of coverage in the 40 quarters ending with the quarter in which the period of disa~ility begins, who is judged to be unable to engage in substantial gainful employment, and whose disability is expected to last for at least 12 months or to result in death, is eligible to receive the equivalent of his or her social security retirement benefit, including dependents' allowances. There is no "means test," but the benefit is offset by benefits from other programs such as workers' compensation if the total benefits exceed 80% of predisability income. If a recipient earns more than $200, benefits are it. The Committee also considered two reports on disability insurance, but did not even include it in the proposed legislation, in part because it was judged to be "the most difficult of all forms of social insurance.,,24
Controversy over a federal program of disability insurance centered on three issues: the entitlement to benefits as a concomitant of steady employment; the cost of the program; and the interference of the federal government in private economic affairs.
Entitlement. From the outset it was apparently agreed by all parties that the beneficiaries of any social insurance program would be workers or former workers, and (in many instances) their families. This general principle was never seriously questioned in the debate over disability insurance, even though, by definition, disabled people were those unable to work. There was, however, a good bit of disagreement over how much participation in the labor force was necessary to establish a right to benefits, and early proposals were quite restrictive in this regard. 25
There was also a good deal of convern over the possibility of malingering; for example, one argument against the inclusion of benefits for dependents of the disabled worker was that the total benefit package may have been large enough to discourage return to work. More generally, concern was expressed that disability insurance benefits as a matter of right would encourage an excessive concern with health, or "valetudinarianism."
Labor, however, resisted the charge that workers would malinger and pushed for less restrictive eligibility requirements and higher benefits. Although is a tran$fer payment totally unrelated to medical expense, it is nonetheless true that, in the minds of many of its sponsors, disability insurance was part of a broad social insurance package that should ultimately include some form of national health insurance--although not necessarily socialized labor, public welfare groups, and the National Consumers League tried to save DI, the Senate kept only the amendments which granted federal aid to the states for permanently and totally disabled persons on welfare (APTD),.and rejected the insurance concept. In 1954, proponents of Dr won a small victory by securing passage of a "disability freeze," which protected a disabled person's right to social security retirement benefits in much the same way as the "waiver of premium" provision on a private life insurance policy. However, this victory came over the strong opposition of the AMA, which in 1952 had helped undermine a similar provision that was passed into law but that included a clause cancelling provision the day before it was to go into effect. While the disability freeze did nothing to help disabled people until they were at retirement age, it did establish the principle that permanent and total disability could be medically determined, thus overcoming one of the major obstacles to DI.
The following year, the House Ways and Means Committee reported, without any public hearings, a social security amendments bill that included insurance for total disability. The bill, which eventually became the Social Security Amendments of 1956 was passed by the House on a vote of 372-31 under a procedure that suspended the rules, barred
34 Th bill amen ments, an~te e ate on eac s~e to orty m~nutes. e had a much more difficult time in the Senate, where it was opposed by the same coalition of interest groups that had fought the earlier legislation, while the major proponent of the bill was the AFL-CIO. A variety of objections were raised, but the most potent one was cost.
Passage of the bill was secured by a narrow margin when Sen. Walter First, when eligibility and benefits are set at the local level, _there is an incentive either to keep benefits lower than neighboring states or localities (to encourage out-migration and discourage in-migration)
or to refuse to give benefits to non-residents; second, fiscal restraints on state and local governments may prevent them from raising the necessary funds; third, as poverty has become a national concern, it is appropriate that policy be formed, and equitable that it be financed, at the national level. 551, and more generally the proposed Family Assistance Plan (FAP) from which it was spawned, represented a major turning point because of its establishment of a uniform guaranteed income provided by the federal government.
Work incentives. Although the issue of work incentives comes up in debates over social insurance, it is especially salient in welfare programs, where the recipients, who almost always have not been working steadily, are more suspect of parasitical motives. For well over a century, however, various groups of the poor have been separated into special "categorical" programs of aid based on the presumed cause of their poverty. As early as the mid-19th century in the United States, people who could not work because of some gross physical or mental handicap were deemed not responsible for their condition and therefore part of the "deserving poor," i.e., those morally worthy of .help.39
Unemployed able-bodied individuals, by contrast, were seen as undeserving of assistance:
if the poor had pauperized themselves through drunkeness, impiety, idleness, extravagance, and immorality, public relief would only reinforce such habits; moral reform for the "vicious" Eoor and work for the idle would cure dependency more quickly. 4
Originally, the deserving poor were a very narrowly circumscribed group, comprising only people who were blind, severely disabled, or believed to be incurably insane, and even they were not always exempt from work requirements. In the Depression years, however, this view changed in two important ways: first, it became hard to insist that disabled people work when there were no jobs for the able-bodied; second, the indigent .aged came to be seen as members of the "deserving," whereas previously their poverty had been seen as the result of personal failure to provide for their financial security. As a result, by midcentury there were at least three major welfare programs--Aid to the Blind, Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, and Old Age Assistance--which were firmly established and, for all practical purposes, beyond moral reproach. Each of these programs was partially funded by the federal government but totally controlled by the states, which decided whether to have the programs and what the benefit levels and eligibility requirements would be.
In contrast to the preferred status in the welfare system of aged, hensive overhauling of the welfare system, failed in Congress. As originally proposed by the Nixon Administration, FAP would have nationalized the welfare system by setting a uniform, federally financed, base benefit for the entire country, subject to state supplementation.
As originally proposed, FAP had something for everybody. Benefits for a significant proportion of the poor, especially those in the South, would be substantially increased; fathers would no longer need to desert their families in order to make them eligible for benefits, (because intact families would now be eligible for aid); there would be relief for the strained budgets of states and big cities with large welfare rolls; and there would be'a provision requiring able-bodied family members (including mothers of school-age children) to accept work or job training.
The combination of increased benefits and strengthened work incentives succeeded in engendering support for FAP across the political spectrum. don't you believe as I do that whether it is human nature or not, while the shooting war is on there isn't anything too good for the man who wears the uniform, but the minute the war is over it is an entirely different story? • • • It seems to me a far drop from only a few short months and years ago when we passed the GI bill by a unanimous vote of the House, while today we are having difficulty in getting legislation on the floor of the House that is just and right and proper. 47
Prominent congressional supporters included conservatives Wilbur Mills (D-Ark) and John Byrnes (R-Wis), and liberal Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn
Veterans also have fought to keep their unique status vis-a-vis civilians.
For example, one of the major arguments against the 1933 proposals was that it would not be proper for veterans to accept welfare or to become wards of the state. Similarly, when a means test was proposed for disability allowances, it was attacked as a "pauper's aff:f.:.davit. ,,48
Although the veterans' groups have, on most bills, presented a unified front, this does not mean that there is no divergence of interest among them. On occasion, factions will form, based on when the veterans served or on type of disability suffered. In the~941 hearings, one issue was whether wartime rates of disability compensation should be paid to veterans who fought under conditions simulating war, i.e., 
Legislative History
Since there is no piece o£ veteran's legislation that is singly more important than the others, we will brie£ly discuss the most re,cent major piece, the Vietnam Era Veteran's Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 (P.L.
93-508). The Act, which increased G.I. educational benefits by 23% and on-the-job training funds and vocational aid for disabled vets by 18%, originated in a proposal by President Nixon to increase educational bene£its by 8%. The House passed a bill with a 14% increase by a 382-0 { vote, but the focal point of controversy was the Senate, where a much more liberal bill was developed.
The main defense of the President's position was offered by a representative of the Veterans' Administration, who argued that benefits had already increased 35% in the previous four years, ana hence an 8% increase was sufficient. The VA emphasized that Congress had never intended that federal benefits constitute the sole support of a veteran and that to do so now would be prohibitively expensive. Apparently one concern of the Nixon Administration was that too great a percentage of benefits was going to recipients who qualified for disability pensions because of disabilities unconnected with military service and that the program was becoming more of a welfare program rather than one of compensation.
Representatives of veterans' organizations countered by heavily emphasizing both the lack of parity between benefits awarded Vietnam veterans compared to those benefits awarded Veterans of World War II and the investment value of educational and rehabilitation programs.
The cost of the proposals was downplayed: "The veterans did not ask was it inflationary when we went to fight the goddamn war; we simply served this country.
it is time this country started serving us."
In part because they combine an emphasis on militarism with social welfare concerns, veterans programs make for strange bedfellows in 
Discussion
In presenting the legislative history of these four major disability programs, we have sought to show the extent to which the programs have developed independently of one another. There is no indication that either Congress or the major interest groups involved saw them as a package or tried to build a coherent disability policy around them. Instead, each of the four major programs examined was seen as part of a different policy: Workers' Compensation was part of a labor-management conflict and was left to the states to resolve, although not without federal encouragement; SSDI was seen as part of the benefits to which one was entitled as'a working member of society and was part of a labor program; SSI was part of a broader dispute as to which groups of nonworking indigents were worthy of aid, and who would assume the growing burden of welfare costs associated with aid;
and veterans' programs have been treated largely as a military, rather than a social welfare, expense. Our analysis shows in addition that the predominant approach to disability has not been on the basis of type of disability (the main exception is probably for the blind, which are not a major expense) but rather on the basis of origin of the disability--e.g., if someone is "at fault," they should compensate--or on worthiness of the disabled person--e.g., their moral worth or military record. In addition, it indicates that what seems like a high aggregate cost for "disability" programs is only in small part a welfare expenditure; the remainder of the expense reflects the operation of a (supposedly) self-sustaining social insurance fund and compensation for damages or for services performed.
Despite the independent development of these programs, they have a major commonality. All of them, and in fact all major effects before the seventies, focus on the supply rather than the demand side of the labor market. Programs have been directed towards the disabled person who cannot work, attempts being made either to make that person "more employable" or to give him or her a stipend. Even vocational rehabilitation, the only "big money" program not discussed above, is of this 20ur categorization is influenced by the work of Berkowitzet al.
--
However, we differ with those writers in their alassification of some programs as disability related. They include virtually all Medicare, Medicaid, and private health and .hospitalization insurance costs as disability expenses (making up 50% of an $83 billion estimated total cost for disability programs in 1973), because these costs are for "non-routine" medical services. We do not see these programs as disability oriented in the sense that most lay people or policymakers would use the term. 
